Seclusion : An Ethical Imperative Driven by the Ḥadīth?

This chapter focuses on seclusion (ʿuzla), which is a contentious theme that has barely been analysed, not least from an ethical perspective, as opposed to a mystical one. It behoves us to delve into this topic from the perspective of earlier works and other figures who wrote or compiled traditions on seclusion. I will begin therefore with a brief historiography of ʿuzla in Islam so that we may understand various ideas and works on this subject to better realise ʿAbd al-Ghanī l-Nābulusī’s (d. 1143/1731) contributions. This will follow with some historical context, followed by a selection of traditions which seem to capture al-Nābulusī’s motives, while a subsequent section will consider whether withdrawing benefit from society presents a problem, despite corruption within society. Finally, the virtue of humility will be evaluated to consider whether it may be congruent with secluding oneself from society.

Notions of “sociality” or interaction are inevitably bound by judgments of morality and relate to ethics, which means the nature and tensions of these relations may provide valuable insights, but the converse is also true, as argued by John Barbour, who believes that there is an urgent need for an ethics of seclusion (Barbour 2004, 4). This begs the question how seclusion relates to ethics and how this understanding may be achieved. If sociality, synonymous in Arabic with ṣuḥba (companionship) and mukhālaṭa (social interaction) among Muslims, has been understudied, seclusion has had almost no attention. Yet, we are given the impression by al-Nābulusī, in his main work on the topic: Takmīl al-Nuʿūt fī Luzūm al-Buyūt (“Perfecting Praiseworthy Qualities by Imposing Home-Seclusion”), that his seclusion was motivated by the ḥadīth traditions which urge this practice, primarily in times of severe trials due to moral decline. The ensuing practice is meant to act as a protective buffer from society. Yet, it is undeniable that al-Nābulusī felt little appreciated by society too, and this caused him considerable consternation. In fact, he turned his attention to seclusion partly for having failed to attain a prominent teaching position (Schlegell 1997). As an eminent scholar in an antagonistic society, he felt the need to justify his rationale via the application of the Islamic tradition to his social reality, which thereby granted him the prerogative to seek separation from society on theological grounds. Such an assessment appears in line with the task of moral knowledge, determining the right action in a particular situation, as Hans Gadamer argued, and the requirement for seclusion certainly demanded an appropriate response for a scholar of al-Nābulusī’s stature (Gadamer 1989, 313–317). We may furthermore extend what Gadamer said about law, to the sources al-Nābulusī uses and his approach towards them, that is that they do not exist solely “in order to be understood historically, but to be concretised in [their] legal validity by being interpreted” such that the interpretations may function in contexts (Gadamer 1989, 309). The Takmīl’s and Ghāyat al-Maṭlūb fī Maḥabbat al-Maḥbūb’s (“The Peak of the Goal in Loving the Beloved”) self-referential and part-ethnographical appraisals represent al-Nābulusī’s style of argument and showcase his deft use of the aḥadīth. Whereas moral texts written by preceding Muslim authors (such as many of those mentioned below) are usually written timelessly and, therefore, offer little or no insight into how the authors’ practical lives, relations and experiences may have shaped their opinions or determined their intellectual trajectories and lived experiences.

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Published in: Ḥadīth and Ethics through the Lens of Interdisciplinarity
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
See chapter on publisher's website: https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004525931_009