Islamic Ethics and the <i>Ḥadīth</i> of Intention

<p dir="ltr">The capacity of the doer to give purpose and meaning to the deed, or intentionality, is a major theoretical and practical concern of Islamic ethics. This chapter illuminates this concern by recourse to a study of the Prophetic report often called the <i>ḥadīth</i> of intention: “Actions are indeed [evaluated] according to intentions.” I approach this report as an entry point into broader debates on human agency in Islamic ethics. To that end, this chapter pursues the following questions: What is the relationship between intention and action? Does the former cause the latter, or does action construct inner life? How do commonly shared motivations create community and how are such motivations cultivated? Where have Muslim jurists and Sufis converged and diverged in their approaches to intentionality? Are intentions performative (embedded in devotional practices and social transactions) or a matter of the heart (presupposing a self that stands behind bodily actions)?</p><p dir="ltr">I grapple with these questions in three conceptual frameworks, which is to say that I relate the <i>ḥadīth</i> of intention to (1) the dialectic of inside (<i>bāṭin</i>) and outside (<i>ẓāhir</i>), (2) communal formation, and (3) the distinction between the transcendental and empirical aspects of juridical-moral norms. My argument, simply put, is that studying the <i>ḥadīth</i> of intention in relation to these conceptual frameworks reveals the resourcefulness of <i>ḥadīth</i> discourse for thinking about ethical agency, since the commentarial literature on this report elaborates a complex view of intention as a psychosomatic orientation that conjoins the self to the Other, the individual to the community, and morality to legality.</p><p dir="ltr">At the outset, I find it apropos to mention my personal motivation for pursuing the question of intentionality and <i>ḥadīth</i> discourse. I suspect that this chapter is an attempt on my part to grapple with the challenges posed to intentionality by psychoanalysis, especially the writings of Sigmund Freud (d. 1939) and Jacques Lacan (d. 1981). I have especially struggled to come to terms with two challenges stemming from my study of their writings. First, they hold that the subject of consciousness is not fully self-transparent and one often acts without total knowledge of one’s latent motivations. Second, they contend that it might be impossible to constantly orient oneself towards a transcendental signifier, that is, to constantly focus on God, when most of one’s actions are embedded in social networks of recognition.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: <i>Ḥadīth</i> and Ethics through the Lens of Interdisciplinarity<br>License: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/" target="_blank">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</a><br>See chapter on publisher's website: <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004525931_012" target="_blank">https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004525931_012</a></p>